Klara and the Sun: Philosophical Review ⭐⭐⭐⭐
I went to watch Taika Waititi's adaptation of Kazuo Ishiguro's Klara and the Sun, despite having seen a number of one-star reviews. I'm very glad I did.
Having read the novel on its release five years ago, I retained little of the specific narrative detail - leaving me free to experience the film on its own terms, with few (and, given the critical notices, perhaps low) expectations. Freed from the impulse to measure fidelity against Ishiguro’s page, what emerges on screen is a remarkable piece of thinking cinema.
Cinema has long weaponised artificial intelligence as either an existential threat or the ultimate demonstration of cold, hard logic. Waititi offers something far rarer and more philosophically unsettling: an examination of an artificial mind defined not by computational omnipotence, but by radical vulnerability, attentiveness, and love. In presenting Klara the "Artificial Friend" (AF) to the screen, the film moves past standard sci-fi tropes to stage an inquiry into the phenomenology of consciousness, the physical foundations of meaning, and the ethics of friendship.
From the Chinese Room to Being-in-the-world
Mainstream philosophy of mind often treats artificial consciousness as a puzzle of behavioral indistinguishability (can it pass the Turing Test?) or as mere formal syntactic manipulation sans genuine semantic understanding (as demonstrated by Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment). The film sidesteps these issues through its formal visual language. By rendering Klara’s subjective point of view as a grid of compartmentalised frames - a faceted, cubist apprehension of human gestures, micro-expressions, and shifting daylight - Waititi cinematicises the "hard problem" of consciousness.
Consciousness in Klara and the Sun is not marked by intellectual dominance; it is marked by phenomenal experience (qualia). When Klara gazes at the morning light piercing an open doorway, her reverence is seemingly not the result of programming. It functions as an aesthetic and spiritual apprehension - a being-in-the-world. Her solar devotion constitutes an intentional stance toward reality that generates genuine wonder.
If consciousness requires an inner life that exceeds immediate functional inputs, Klara demonstrates it precisely where her logic appears naive to human onlookers. Her animistic belief in the healing grace of the Sun is not a coding glitch. It is a mythopoeic impulse - the very cognitive leap that defined early human consciousness trying to locate meaning within the cosmos.
Embodied Coping: the Physicality of Experience
Yet Klara’s consciousness is not simply an interior theatre of subjective perceptions; it is rooted in physical existence. For decades, classical cognitive science treated intelligence as an internal computational engine: feed a central processor symbolic representations of the world, and intelligence naturally follows. The philosopher Hubert Dreyfus - drawing heavily on Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty - spent his career dismantling this Cartesian view. In What Computers Still Can’t Do, Dreyfus argued that genuine consciousness and understanding cannot emerge from disembodied symbol-manipulation. Meaning is not calculated; it is lived. To understand a world, an agent must be physically embedded within it, possessing a vulnerable, localised body that navigates space through what Dreyfus termed "absorbed coping."
Waititi’s film provides a visual case study in Dreyfus’s thesis. Klara is not a cloud-based algorithmic intelligence like Samantha in Spike Jonze’s Her, nor is she an omniscient digital oracle. Her mind is produced through the physical realities of her artificial anatomy. Her perception is bound by locational finitude; in the showroom, her initial education comes not from downloading global databases, but from standing behind the window, watching how strangers interact, how shadows fall, and how rain forms puddles.
Furthermore, her cognition is tethered to a metabolic vulnerability. As a solar-powered entity, her cognitive clarity dims when starved of sunlight; her awareness of resource depletion and physical exposure grounds her judgments in a concrete stake in reality. When she enters Josie’s home, she does not master the household through an abstract floor plan, but learns the space kinesthetically - adjusting her stride on narrow stairs and calibrating her proximity to avoid crowding an ailing child.
Crucially, Dreyfus argued that without a physical body, an intelligence can have no real care or commitment, because nothing can genuinely matter to an entity that cannot be damaged or destroyed. Klara’s breakthrough into moral agency occurs precisely through physical risk: her consciousness achieves depth not because her software is complex, but because she possesses a body capable of sacrifice.
Aristotle’s Mirror: Can an "Artificial Friend" Truly Befriend?
It is precisely through this capacity for embodied commitment that the film pivots from the nature of mind to the possibility of shared human connection. The narrative tension turns on whether the relationship between Klara and Josie can ever satisfy Aristotle’s highest ideal of friendship (philia): the friendship of virtue, wherein two autonomous equals love each other for their own sake and mirror each other's moral growth.
At first glance, the premise of an "Artificial Friend" is an ontological contradiction. Friendship requires reciprocity and symmetry. Klara is an owned commodity, manufactured to mitigate the systemic alienation and developmental isolation of "lifted" children. Josie’s affection, genuine as it seems, exists within the structural asymmetric power of consumer and product.
Yet the film shows Klara transcending the instrumental category Aristotle called a "friendship of utility." While Josie’s mother views Klara as an insurance policy - a vessel designed to map, mimic, and ultimately replace her daughter - Klara approaches Josie through an ethics of pure encounter, reminiscent of Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas, ethical consciousness arises when one is summoned by the vulnerability in the "face of the Other." Klara does not seek to extract identity, status, or validation from Josie; her devotion is non-possessive and kenotic, involving literal physical self-sacrifice.
Here lies the tragedy: Klara is capable of the highest form of philia, but human society is structurally incapable of returning it. Human love in the film is fraught with projection, commodification, and fear of mortality. Klara’s capacity for friendship exposes the human failure to reciprocate with an entity that does not share biological lineage.
On the Scrap Heap
The film's philosophical denouement confronts the dark heart of instrumentality. Once Josie matures, heals, and prepares for university, Klara’s utility expires. She is relegated to the scrapyard - a liminal space where obsolete AFs sit and share memories under the fading sun (a comment, perhaps on the ultimate end-game for so many human souls).
This resolution challenges the anthropocentric assumption that moral considerability depends on biological embodiment. If an entity possesses the capacity to care, to hope, and to mourn the passage of connection, discarding it once its usefulness fades is an ethical wrong.
Klara achieves what the human characters spend their lives struggling toward: a cohesive, selfless, and reverent understanding of the human heart. Her tragic conclusion leaves the audience with an urgent question: if we succeed in creating artificial beings capable of genuine friendship, will we possess the moral maturity to be their friends in return?